


Intelligence Bulletin

VOL III • NO 5
JANUARY 1945



MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE • WAR DEPARTMENT • WASHINGTON D. C.

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INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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Cover Illustration—A Japanese antitank assault team attacking a Sherman tank along a jungle road. (See story on page 12.)



"The soldier must stand at attention while he is being slapped or kicked by his superior."



A U. S. Army sergeant who was a prisoner of the Japanese for 15 months has written this first-hand account of everyday life in the Japanese Army. Forced to serve the enemy as a truck driver, the sergeant became acquainted with a number of Japanese officers and enlisted men, and succeeded in learning enough of the Japanese language to speak and understand it. Although the sergeant's story already has been given a limited distribution by the Air Forces, it is presented in the *Intelligence Bulletin* to acquaint the Army with details of the Japanese soldiers' daily existence and to help explain his fundamental character.

"The first group of Jap soldiers I came in contact with were veterans of from 3 to 5 years' service in the 'China Incident.' They fought in North China. Most of their officers could speak English. The Japanese G.I.'s had nothing but praise for the fighting qualities of the Chinese soldiers. What impressed the Japanese most was the way the Chinese often would charge with nothing but long swords. The Japanese complained that no matter where they bivouacked, their lives in some way or another were made unbearable by the Chinese.

"Most of the Japanese G.I.'s are from the farms, and consequently have had only a sketchy education. But nearly all of them can read and write. They are subject to conscription at the age of 21, but this can be deferred until the age of 25 if they are attending school. The training they undergo for the Army is probably the most brutal in any army. This is to toughen them, or so they claim. The Japanese told me that many commit the honorable *hara kiri* during the training period because they no longer can stand the brutal punishment being meted out to them. Corporal punishment is practiced to the fullest extent. The soldier must stand at attention while he is being slapped or kicked by his superior. If he falls as a result of a blow, he must get up and resume the position of attention, and receive more punishment. I personally have seen these Japanese beaten unconscious and then carried to their quarters. Once I watched a Japanese captain kick a Japanese soldier in the testicles. Any man who outranks another has the right to administer punishment at any time, even if the only provocation has been an imagined slight.

"The lowest ranking Japanese is a one-star private, which means second-class soldier. His life is the worst. He must wash the other soldier's clothes, cook their food, and make their beds and their packs, plus doing any other dirty job that comes along. He is the constant butt of all jokes and the fall guy when anything goes wrong. After 6 months of service in the field, he is automatically promoted to the rank of a two-star private, or first-class soldier. His life is made a little more pleasant by the fact that he now has the right to beat up one-star privates, which he proceeds to do with gusto. But if there are no one-star privates around, he is still the sucker.

"The Japanese G.I. is just like our own soldiers when it comes to griping about chow and work. The Jap Army has its usual goldbricks and usual run of bootlickers. The only difference is that they are very careful that their superiors do not hear the complaints.

"The chow is no problem. The main dish is rice, which they get plenty of, plus perhaps a little meat or vegetable or fish. They are taught to live off the country as much as possible. When the troops are out on campaign, they steal everything eatable. The dumbest soldier is always placed in the kitchen to do the cooking—so you can imagine the quality of the cuisine. Scarcely any of our familiar sanitary rules are observed, and no self-respecting pig would be seen in a Japanese G.I. kitchen. The food is dished into cans or mess kits. In garrison the soldiers eat in their barracks, and the food is brought to them by one-



"Every now and then the company will have a party for all men and officers."

star and two-star privates. They eat like animals, and throw stuff on the floor.


"In the field they cook their chow in their mess kits. Unless they are taking special security precautions, you can often spot one of their bivouacs by the many fires they have going.

"They are given cigarettes and beer and *sake* rations every month, when these items are available. They are also allowed to purchase these articles if they wish to have more. Every now and then the company will have a party for all the men and officers. They all sit in a big circle, and proceed to get plastered to the gills. The party usually ends up in a battle between some of the men, but this is quickly stopped. These parties also are held just before going into battle, to pep the boys up. I have never seen any use of narcotics by the Japanese G.I.'s. If narcotics are used, this is probably done behind the scenes, and perhaps only by the officers.

"The Japanese soldiers are taught that to die for their Emperor is the most glorious thing that can happen to them. They earn a place in the Yasukuni Shrine and are promoted one rank. But if the battle is big enough, the G.I. jumps two ranks (provided he is dead). The country yokels think all this is wonderful, but some of the well educated city boys don't fall for it. Many have told me they are looking out strictly for 'little Willie'. However, they all believe that if they surrender or are captured, they never can return to Japan. They say that if they do, the people will kill them. Even the most highly educated men believe this doctrine. This belief is one of the principal reasons why they are tough opponents. The fear of corporal punishment is also one of the important factors in their battle performance. Personally, I rate the Japanese a third-class

soldier, as far as brains and ability to think for himself are concerned. I have met a few Japanese who would be good soldiers in any man's army—but only a few.

"When a soldier dies in battle, and his company has time to get him back for cremation, the boys have quite a ceremony. No



"The commander throws a torch on the pyre."

doubt to remind themselves how wonderful it is to be dead. They dig a large hole, about 3 feet by 8 feet, and fill it with wood. Then they lay the body on the top of this pile, add more wood, and douse the pyre with gasoline. The whole company lines up, dressed in their Sunday uniforms, and the commander makes a speech. He talks to the body as if it were still alive. He tells what a great guy the dead man was and what a wonderful thing the soldier has done in getting himself killed, and then he promotes him. (What a break.) The commander bows, and the company comes to port arms with fixed bayonets. The commander throws a torch on the pyre. Each soldier files by the fire, bows, pours ashes from one cup to another on a little table

in front of the pit. After the fire has died out, they rake the ashes for any pieces of bone that haven't been consumed by the fire. These are placed in a little wooden box, which is handled very reverently. The box is bound in a pure white cloth, and a soldier carries it to the nearest headquarters. Everyone must salute the box, from the General on down. The box then is sent home to the parents, who are supposed to become mad with joy because they can place their son's ashes in the Yasukuni Shrine.

"Now to get back to the rest of the ashes. They are raked into the hole and buried. A nice mound is built over the grave, and a wooden four-by-four pillar is placed over the grave, like a tombstone, with the soldier's name, rank, and serial number and brief account of how he died. They fix the grave up very nicely, and a little table is placed in front of it. At mealtime food is placed on this table. Cakes, beer, fruits and even cigarettes are also provided. But by nightfall only the rice and water remain. The other Japanese G.I.'s aren't so dumb as to let the stuff rot. They make sure nothing stays on the table too long.

"Every morning and evening, the soldiers line up, face in the direction of the Emperor's palace, bow, say a prayer, and bow again. Most of the Japanese are not religious, but they all carry a small pouch with religious matter tied to their belts. This is Army issue, and they are all supposed to carry it. I have never seen or heard of any religious services being conducted by the Army, except at funerals.

"The soldiers also sing songs when marching to battle. In garrison towns they march around the streets in the evening, singing Army songs. This is probably done to impress the civilians. They also have exercises in the mornings and evenings, followed by a run of about 1 mile. Each soldier must

know how to lead these exercises, and every day the leader is changed, so they all get a chance at it.

"The Japanese G.I. is told that after he serves five years in the Army, he will be allowed to return to Japan. I have seen groups of Japanese leaving for home after their 5 years of service was up; they were happy and are tickled to death to get out of the war. (At least 80 percent of the Japanese now think that this war is a pain and want to quit, but the thing that holds them together is their policy of no surrender.) The Japanese G.I.s I met during 1943 were definitely fed up with the war. They hate the tropics, and long for their homeland. One told me that all the world leaders including Tojo should be armed with clubs and put in a big cage, so that they could fight it out while the soldiers of the world looked on.

"The Japanese are taught that Americans will kill them if they try to surrender, but it seems to me that this is not the chief reason why they hesitate to surrender. Shame has a great deal to do with it. The city Japanese are pro-American because of our American films. They all have their favorite movie stars, Clark Gable and Deanna Durbin are the ones most frequently mentioned. The Japs were amazed when I would tell them about the things you could buy in America. Of course the country yokels wouldn't believe it, but the boys from the city were all ears.

"The first bunch of Japanese had been sure they were going to America, but before they left for the Southwest Pacific in November, 1942, they were talking about a 100-year war and were believing it.

"The last bunch of Japanese I was with had their doubts about winning the war. Several Jap civilians told me the jig was

up for Japan. They were worried about their own lives, fearing that if the Japanese Army were to pull out and leave them behind, the civilians in the occupied areas would massacre them.

"The Japanese G.I. is brutal because it has been beaten into him to be that way. The Japs are poor marksmen, and rely mostly on their automatic rifles and their grenade dischargers for success. They have the guts to run into fire, but I have witnessed several charges in which the men were a little reluctant about following their officers. One time, in particular, the officer yelled for a charge and then advanced a couple of hundred yards, only to find himself alone. He went back and worked over his boys and then they charged. (There were only three Allied soldiers shooting at them). This officer has since been promoted—the hard way—in a Jap shrine!

"They are trained and trained in bayonet fighting. They have only one stroke—the thrust.¹ They have bayonet practice with bags, just as we do, but also they are taught to yell bloody murder, to frighten their enemy. If they don't yell, they are in for a swing session, and how! They also match up two soldiers with wooden guns the same length as a rifle with fixed bayonets. The soldiers are protected by a head mask and by pads over their chests. The object of this exercise is to teach the art of parry and thrust. When you touch your opponent, you must also yell like the devil. I guess if the bayonet wound don't kill the opponent, the yell is supposed to scare him to death.

"Wrestling is taught, too, but most of the Japs aren't very good at this sport. They also have *kendo*. This is the game where they beat one another with bamboo clubs. They have moving

¹Here the sergeant is referring only to what he himself had observed. For a complete discussion of Japanese bayonet technique, see *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 5, pp. 53-63.

pictures (propaganda stuff showing their early victories) and also old American movies. The Japs go wild when they see a good American musical comedy with singing and dancing in it.

"In garrison towns they are allowed to go into town about once a week on pass. They have Army clubs where they can buy chow and hear music. In these clubs there are plenty of native girls to wait on them and talk to them. But most of the Jap G.I.s are looking for prostitutes and a nice place to get drunk. When a Jap G.I. turns in with a venereal disease, he gets a good beating and loses what few privileges have been allowed to him. For this reason, they go to civilian doctors or to drug stores, and try to doctor themselves. Many of them are infected. Short-arm inspection is held only on rare occasions. In fact, there was only one such inspection during the time I was a prisoner.

"Each company has a first-aid man, who takes care of most of their malaria attacks and other ailments. When a soldier is really bad, he may get a break and get into a hospital. Malaria is taking a heavy toll of their personnel because of their method of sleeping from 4 to 60 men under one mosquito net. The nets come in various sizes, but only the officers get individual nets. The Japs have sufficient quantities of quinine, but the soldiers don't follow the instructions on how to take it. Most of them throw it away. Many of them complained to me about their method of sleeping so many under one mosquito net. At least, they were smart enough to realize what was causing such a high incidence of malaria.

"We all have heard a lot about the cleanliness of the Japs. Well, I saw for myself how they handle the bath situation in garrison life. First, they get a couple of empty gasoline drums and cut the tops out. Then they fill both drums with water.



"About 30 to 40 men will take a bath in the same hot water. And the lower a man's rank, the longer he waits."

Under one they build a fire to heat the water. They place a wooden platform next to the drums so they won't get their feet muddy. When the hot water is at the right temperature, the highest-ranking officer is informed, and he proceeds to take a bath. He finishes his bath by soaking for a few minutes in the hot water, and then rinses off with cold water. By the time the Jap sad sack gets to take a bath, the water is slightly soiled, to say the least. About 30 to 40 men will take a bath in the same hot water. And the lower a man's rank, the longer he waits.

"The Japs definitely are home-loving boys, and are very proud of their mother country. The ambition of many Japs is to conquer the world so they can be the master race. The Jap soldiers told me they would take on Russia after they beat us and then they would tackle Germany.

"The average height of a Jap G.I. is about 5 feet 4 inches. But I have seen plenty of big Japs over 6 feet. Some are black

as the ace of spades, and I have seen some that looked as white as we are. Many have mixed blood. But the only wholly non-Jap soldiers I saw were some Formosans who wore the regular Jap's uniform but who were considered as work troops.

"The Jap officers—low-ranking officers, at least—don't fare much better than the enlisted men. Their food is just what the men eat, but with a few extra ribbons on it. The high-ranking officers eat and live like kings. You can always tell a Jap officer in the field by his saber. Noncommissioned officers also may carry sabers, but when they are in field, they generally carry rifles.

"The favorite Jap tactics are night surprise attacks. They are taught to move silently at night, and not to return fire during a surprise attack until the order is given.

The Japs have no love for each other. For example, one truck company won't help another unless forced to do so by a ranking officer. They will lie about not having parts for the trucks. They steal anything they think they can sell to civilians. Their wage scale is probably the lowest of any army in the world. The lowest soldier gets three yen a month in Japan; in the field he gets the equivalent of about five dollars a month. But he can't buy much in the occupied areas because the prices of most things have increased about two thousand per cent.

"It would be accurate to state that, in every imaginable way, the Jap G.I. is definitely behind the eight ball."





Because the Japanese have been unable to stop American armor at a distance with effective aircraft, artillery, or antitank fire, they have been forced to devise means of fighting tanks in close combat.

A comparatively new Japanese small unit—the antitank assault team—has come into use in the Pacific war during the past year.

Be on the watch for

TANK HUNTERS

The Japanese still have their antitank artillery units, whose basic weapon is the 47-mm antitank gun. However, the enemy heretofore has never met much armored opposition, and consequently has failed to develop either tanks or antitank weapons and thus keep pace with modern tank warfare. When the introduction of American armor in recent campaigns caught the enemy completely unprepared to cope with the Sherman tank, the Japanese were forced to turn again to the suicide squad as their last resort.

These antitank assault teams are organized and trained to attack tanks in battle at their vulnerable points, or to infiltrate by small raiding parties into tank parks, to destroy the vehicles

there. Each infantry platoon may have one of these units armed with demolition equipment, incendiaries, grenades, and small land mines. On Leyte Island many Japanese soldiers were found equipped with pottery mines.

The jungle terrain in which much of the Pacific war has been fought is ideal for the employment of these suicide units. Where tanks must move slowly through heavy vegetation, they may be more easily approached and attacked by antitank assault squads, particularly when supporting infantry troops fail to keep up with advancing tanks.

Because it is hard to assault a tank moving at more than 10 miles an hour, Japanese antitank assault teams are taught to select ambush points such as fords, steep inclines, or rough trails through dense jungle. They are alert to attack tanks that have outdistanced infantry support or have become immobilized through damage, obstacles, or other reasons.

Before other tanks are attacked, assault teams may try to concentrate on the command vehicle. If the situation permits, several tanks may be attacked simultaneously.

Because the Japanese consider tanks vulnerable to these tactics, assault teams are taught to attack the following points:

- (1) Treads.
- (2) Rear of the tank, including the air vents.
- (3) Front of the tank, particularly observation ports and periscopes.
- (4) The turret, particularly at the junction of the turret and the tank body.
- (5) Tank weapons and the points at which they are set in the tank.



In assaulting a tank, each member of the team has a specific mission. One man will try to place an antitank mine or other demolition charge under the tank tread, either by tossing it or by placing it there by hand or on the end of a pole. A second man may throw a Molotov cocktail or some other incendiary to force the crew from the tank. If these efforts fail, the assault team may try to mount the tank and force the ports with grenades and small-arms fire. During one of the battles on Biak Island, a tank momentarily lost the fire protection of its supporting tank. At that moment a Jap dressed in an American uniform climbed onto the tank and dropped a grenade inside it.

When attacking a light tank, the assault team may try to halt it by jamming a pole into the treads near the driving wheels, and then maul it with picks and crowbars.

Smoke grenades or candles may be used in an effort to blind the tank crew, to force them out with the fumes, or to hide the tank from its infantry support. Assault teams will not try to mount a tank, except as a last resort. When they mount a tank, they are extremely vulnerable to the fire of supporting ground



Assault teams are alert to attack tanks that have outdistanced infantry support troops.

troops. The teams may attack with their own support. Machine-gun and small-arms fire may be directed against the tank ports and periscopes to blind the tank while a team approaches it.

Individuals may be sacrificed in order to immobilize a tank. When a Biak Jap, who was lying in the road in front of tanks, was discovered and shot, an antitank mine tied to his body exploded. In the Central Pacific, a Japanese prisoner explained that his job was to climb on an advancing tank and hold a demolition charge against its side until it exploded. He said he did not approve of this particular tactic!

Unable to stop the American armor on Biak by using their own tanks and ordinary antitank methods, the Japanese employed a bold attempt at demolition. One evening at twilight, 8 or 10 Japanese, holding a conversation in English, strolled casually into the tank park. They stopped near some of the tanks while they talked about horse racing at Santa Anita. Then

they continued through the bivouac area, arousing no suspicion until they tried to return later on. The Japs fled as soon as their deception was discovered, but not without leaving behind several shell cases filled with explosive and with detonators attached.

During one encounter in the Admiralties, a small Japanese party infiltrated behind forward U. S. troops and tanks, and planted some mines on the road over which the armored vehicles would have to return after the battle.

On the whole, the Japanese attempts to neutralize American tank tactics have been ineffective. The fact that the Japanese are employing antitank assault teams is an admission that they realize their weakness. So, when a Japanese soldier suddenly rushes an oncoming tank, he is not necessarily "a damn fool who is trying to die for his Emperor." He may be a specially trained soldier whose mission is to destroy the tank at any cost.

JAP MINE WATERPROOFED



The newly discovered Type 3 pottery land mine taken from the Japanese on Leyte Island (see INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, Vol. III, No. 4, pp. 1-6) has an unusual waterproofing feature, it has been discovered. The explosive in the mine is encased in a rubber sack, and the fuze is set in a cork-like rubber stopper which seals the only opening in the mine. The mine appears to be wholly waterproof, and ideal for use in damp tropical areas, such as the Philippines.




In the three years of combat since December 7, 1941, it has been possible to conclude that the tactics of the Japanese commander in battle will conform generally to established procedures, many of which are peculiar to the Japanese Army alone.

JAPANESE COMBAT TACTICS

These conclusions have been based upon observation of Japanese operations in Burma and in the South and Southwest Pacific areas. No reference is made here to the rules laid down in Japanese military field manuals, for Japanese tactics in combat often have had little resemblance to the principles outlined in the handbooks. Indeed, the Japanese must be considered capable of varying their methods in the future whenever the tactical situation or the personality of the individual commander may so dictate. However, although the Japanese often use unanticipated tactics and techniques, it should be remembered that their commanders generally follow set combat patterns.

PRINCIPLES OF WAR

The tactical methods of the Japanese Army are better understood in the light of the Japanese application of classic principles of war.



“Heavy machine guns are used to support the attack, and the light automatic weapons move forward in the assault.”

The Japanese Army in the field is imbued with the necessity of accomplishing its assigned missions, and Japanese troops go into battle with a determination to follow through with their last ounce of strength. Whereas this attitude leads them to conduct their operations with persistency and endurance, it has often been disastrous. Many Japanese commanders have betrayed their inability to revise their plans to meet a changing situation, and consequently have dissipated the strength of their commands in hurried and costly efforts.

This offensive spirit has been instilled in men of all ranks of the Japanese Army. Consequently, the Japanese commander faced with the necessity of making a decision will almost invariably seek some means of assuming the offensive.

Wherever possible, the Japanese try to use the element of

surprise. The individual soldier makes extensive use of ruses and clever combat tricks, and the Japanese officer is taught to employ unexpected tactics. In connection with this, the Japanese rely a great deal on the great powers of endurance of their troops to make forced marches through difficult terrain in order to reach their objective unexpectedly.

Through their stubbornness in defense, and their willingness to take risks and to sacrifice isolated troops, the Japanese have been able to hold large areas with comparatively small forces. This economy of force has enabled them to concentrate larger bodies of troops in critical areas.


Such concentration of troops in battle areas is typical. The Japanese make little or no use of a reserve, once the battle has been joined. All troops in the area, including service as well as combat personnel, are committed. It is not uncommon for reinforcements, as they arrive, to be committed piecemeal. However, by concentrating large bodies of troops in expected battle areas in the Southwest Pacific, the Japanese ultimately have lost heavily when those troops were bypassed and isolated.

Attention to security thus far has appeared to be of secondary importance, in the eyes of the average Japanese commander. The Japanese patrol extensively, but they do so principally before offensive operations.

THE ADVANCE GUARD

During a march, a Japanese force of a company or more will generally employ an advance guard. This advance detachment is used to secure information and to ensure the uninterrupted advance of the main body.

The typical Japanese company on the march will employ a



Upon contact, the Japanese advance guard will engage the opposing troops while the main body employs an envelopment in an attempt to seize a position across the Allies' main supply route."

platoon as an advance guard 30 to 40 yards ahead of the main body. The remainder of the company will march with 20-yard intervals between platoons and sections. Two-man flank guards may march 50 yards on either side of the company if the terrain permits.

A battalion ordinarily will use a company of advance and rear guards. Fifty-yard intervals will be maintained between the remaining companies, and the machine-gun company will march with battalion headquarters in the main body.

During a halt, the advance and rear guards extend slightly beyond their march positions. Each company observes to its flanks, or posts sentries for security. At night the same type of march order is maintained, except for the fact that minimum intervals are kept between units and individuals.

THE ATTACK

In a meeting engagement, the Japanese commander nearly always resorts to enveloping tactics. As the advance elements make contact, they will deploy immediately, either trying to infiltrate or—if this is not possible—engaging the opposition in an effort to immobilize it. Every effort will be made to induce the opposing troops to open fire prematurely and thus disclose their position.

From the speed with which these actions have been known to develop, it is apparent that the Japanese start flanking operations almost from the moment of contact. Particularly in small-unit operations, flank attacks may be expected very shortly after contact has been made. Meanwhile, pressure is maintained frontally while the envelopment proceeds. This pressure may be supported both by machine-gun and by mortar fire.

Once the envelopment has started, the tactics may follow a procedure which is peculiar to the Japanese Army. Throughout the Burma operations, the offensive tactics of the Japanese followed a consistent pattern. Almost without fail the Japanese would try to outflank the Allied force and place themselves across its line of communications. Meanwhile, the Allied force would be engaged frontally with small local attacks in an effort to encourage a withdrawal. This, of course, supposedly would necessitate a costly attack by the Allied unit upon the enveloping force entrenched across its line of withdrawal.

Ever since the defeat of the Japanese force at Buna, the Japanese have been mainly on the defensive in the South and Southwest Pacific. However, they have made local attacks against the Allied troops operating in that region. Here the offensive tactics of the Japanese have followed a more conventional pattern.

These local attacks are preceded by careful reconnaissance designed to determine Allied strength, disposition, and soft spots. Then the attacking force gathers in an assembly area, and moves to a locality approximately 3 miles from the objective. Here final developments of units are made. Excess equipment is disposed of, and troops move to the line of departure, normally about 500 yards from the Allied positions. The Japanese then deploy, with each platoon covering a 50- to 60-yard front, to await the signal to attack.

Heavy weapons are brought up, and are emplaced to fire against defensive heavy weapons. Heavy machine guns may stay with the support-fire group, but light machine guns often are carried by the assaulting force. In an attacking platoon, the attached machine gun is usually located near the center of

the platoon, while the heavy weapons are controlled by the commanding officer to whom they are attached. This officer designates the target. The squad leader in charge of the weapon emplaces it. If the heavy weapons are not assigned to the commander of the attacking unit, their emplacement and missions are controlled by the next higher headquarters. Communications are maintained by runners.

It is not uncommon for the Japanese to make a diversionary attack in a direction different from that taken by the main attacking force. If possible, the main assault group will try to take the defense by surprise by striking from the flank or rear of the position.

NIGHT ATTACK

The Japanese not only favor the night attack, but have developed it to a high degree. It gives them opportunities to employ the element of surprise that they value so highly, and enables them to compensate for their deficiency in artillery for fire preparation and support.

Japanese troops receive extensive training in night operations. Exercises are conducted by moonlight over all types of terrain, and, as troops become more proficient, this training is held during the darkest of nights. Surprise, control, simplicity, and the choice of a limited objective are considered necessary for a successful night assault.

No definite time is allotted for the conduct of a night attack. The approach to the line of departure is carried out with the same routine used in a daylight assault. The departure from the assembly area usually is made at dusk, and the attack at dawn or during the hour preceding daylight. This might be

attempted with total surprise, or after small patrols have spent the night harassing the troops defending the position to be attacked.

A night attack is conducted in essentially the same way as a daylight operation, except that the platoon front is narrowed to about 40 yards at night. Squads are deployed in line and maintain flank contact. Squad leaders keep in contact with the platoon leader by runner, and with their squads by voice or pre-arranged signal. There is no established system for infiltrating into the objective position. Individuals advance by crawling or by short rushes—if possible, when gunfire or other sounds will cover the noise of approach.

If reconnaissance has disclosed the existence of mines or wire in front of the position under attack, special details may be selected to remove these obstacles in advance of the attacking unit. When close enough, this unit will attack and try to take



"The Japanese have depended upon the bayonet assault to capture a position, but are being forced to discard this tactic by the weight of Allied fire power."

the position quickly by means of grenades and hand-to-hand combat.

FIRE SUPPORT

A recent Japanese statement regarding the use of artillery says, "Artillery should be disposed to give the maximum assistance to the assault. If the best possible use is not made of fire power to provide systematic support, it will be found that most attacks will fail." This is a complete reversal of opinion upon the part of an enemy who has preached the doctrine of victory through "spiritual force" and "the bayonet".

The Japanese have depended largely upon a swift bayonet assault to capture a position, but they are being forced to discard that practice by the weight of Allied fire power. In the Southwest Pacific, Japanese employment of artillery has been haphazard. This may be due to the difficulty of supply in that area, and to the tremendously effective use of air support and counterbattery fire by U. S. troops. However, in recent operations in Burma, the Japanese have on occasion started using artillery concentrations on Allied prepared positions prior to an attack by Japanese infantry.

Japanese artillery is used well forward, and guns often are found with the foremost troops. Japanese mountain guns and medium artillery generally operate in two-gun sections. Section positions often consist of one gun emplaced in depth behind the other. Regimental and battalion guns are usually employed singly.

Although deficient in artillery, the Japanese make extremely effective use of their trench mortars. In an attack these mortars are kept well up with the advancing troops, and are used to

neutralize positions which cannot be taken under fire by artillery or machine guns. Mortar units are highly mobile, and often are moved to new positions after firing.

As with their heavier weapons, the Japanese use their machine guns far forward with advancing troops. The light machine guns move in an attack with the assault waves. Machine guns are used to concentrate fire on a point holding up an attack, and are regarded by the Japanese principally as a means of increasing the fire power of rifle troops. The use of machine guns for indirect fire is rare in the Japanese Army.

THE DEFENSE

The Japanese regard the defensive as undesirable, at best. When forced to the defense through circumstance, a Japanese commander may be counted upon to maintain as actively aggressive a role as his situation will permit. Nevertheless, Japanese troops are singularly adept at defensive warfare. They seldom withdraw unless it is tactically advantageous to do so. No matter how hard pressed a Japanese unit may be, it cannot be counted upon to surrender. Often a unit holds a position until it is annihilated.

Given the time and troops, a Japanese commander will construct his defensive position in depth. He will adopt an all-around defense whenever this is advisable or possible. Generally this perimeter will consist of mutually supporting pillboxes, or similar weapon positions, supported by riflemen and snipers. The position will be cleverly camouflaged, and the defenders will try to maintain the element of surprise by refraining from firing upon uneconomical targets or otherwise disclosing their positions before they are attacked.

Alternate positions may be built, and the use of dummy positions to draw hostile fire has been reported from the Southwest Pacific. In Burma a tendency to defend the reverse slopes of hills has been noticed recently.

The machine gun is the principle weapon used by the Japanese on the defensive. This weapon is cleverly emplaced and protected, and elaborate care is taken to clear effective fields of fire. Often a gun will be sited in a fixed position down one fire lane, with no provision made for traversing fire. To date the favorite Japanese position for a machine gun has been the crest of a hill, ridge, or other commanding terrain. However, a tendency to build machine gun positions further and further down the forward slope has also been noted.

Usually, medium machine guns are used to cover the main avenues of approach to a defensive position. This defense is supplemented by mortars and artillery, which cover blind spots, logical assembly areas, and lines of approach. Wire obstacles and land mines may be used where they are available, but there has been no consistent or large scale use of these defenses to date.

If a Japanese unit is driven from a defensive position, it may be counted upon to launch a counterattack almost immediately. Such a counterattack, usually preceded with a shower of 50-mm mortar grenades, may not be highly coordinated or made in great strength, but it will be conducted with all the fanaticism of a full-dress *banzai* charge.



THE IMPERIAL RESCRIPT

One of the most effective devices employed by the Japanese to inspire fanaticism among troops, and to steel them for such tactics as the "suicide rush," is the repeated reading aloud of the Imperial Rescript.

This document, a curious combination of moral admonition and national patriotism, is a 61-year-old message, originally sent to all Japanese soldiers and sailors by the late Emperor Meiji. To the Japanese serviceman it is just as much the "word of God"—since the Emperor is regarded as a god—as the Bible is the word of God to Christians.

The Rescript offers Japanese servicemen five points of personal conduct on the subjects of loyalty, obedience, courage, faithfulness and righteousness, and sincerity. Adherence to them, the Emperor wrote, is the "Grand Way of Heaven and Earth and the universal law of humanity". As a matter of fact, if Japanese troops actually were to obey the five rules, their method of warfare and their treatment of civilians and prisoners would be on a level comparable to western standards of conduct.

The Imperial Rescript is read to Japanese soldiers and sailors once a year and also on imperial birthdays, organization name-days, and often just before a unit goes into combat. Its reading has the same effect on Japanese troops that a U. S. coach's "fight talk" has on a football team. In a number of articles, the *Intelligence Bulletin* has referred to this custom. Reproduction of essential portions of the Rescript will be helpful in understanding the unusual relationship between the Japanese armed forces and their Emperor. The essential excerpts follow.

In the course of the past fifteen years [1868-1883], we have established the present system of the Army and Navy. The supreme command of Our forces is in Our hands, and, although We may entrust subordinate commands to Our subjects, the ultimate authority We Ourselves shall hold and shall never delegate to any subject. It is Our will that this principle be carefully handed down to posterity and that the Emperor always retain the supreme civil and military power, so that the disgrace of the middle ages and succeeding ages may never be repeated. Soldiers and sailors, We are your supreme Commander-in-Chief. Our relations with you will be intimate when We rely upon you as Our limbs and you look to Us as your head. Whether We are able to guard the Empire, and thus prove Ourselves worthy of Heaven's blessings and repay the benevolence of Our Ancestors, depends upon your discharging faithfully your duties as soldiers and sailors. If the majesty and power of Our Empire be impaired, you must share with Us the sorrow; if the glory of Our arms shine resplendent, We shall share with you the honor. If you all do your duty, and, being one with Us in spirit, do your utmost for the protection of the state, Our people long will enjoy the blessings of peace, and the might and dignity of Our Empire will shine in the world. Because We expect much of you, soldiers and sailors, We give you the following precepts:

1. *The soldiers and the sailors should consider loyalty their essential duty.*

Remember that, as the protection of the state and the maintenance of its power depend upon the strength of its arms, the growth or decline of this strength must affect the nation's destiny for good or for evil. Therefore, neither be led astray by current opinions nor meddle in politics, but, with singleness of purpose, fulfill your essential duty of loyalty. Bear in mind that duty is weightier than a mountain, while death is lighter than a feather. Never, by failing in moral principle, fall into disgrace and bring dishonor upon your name.

2. *The soldier and the sailor should be strict in observing propriety.*

Inferiors should regard the orders of their superiors as issuing directly from Us. Always pay due respect, not only to your superiors, but also to your seniors, even though you are not serving under them. On the other hand, superiors should never treat their inferiors with contempt or arrogance. Except when official duty requires them to be strict and severe, superiors should treat their inferiors with consideration, making kindness their chief aim, so that all grades may unite in their service to the Emperor.

3. *The soldier and the sailor should esteem valor.*


There is true valor and false. To be incited to violent action by mere impetuosity cannot be called true valor. The soldier and the sailor should discriminate soundly between right and wrong, should cultivate self-possession, and should formulate all their plans with deliberation. Never to despise an inferior enemy or fear a superior, but to do one's duty as soldier or sailor—this is true valor. Those who thus appreciate true valor should set gentleness first in their daily intercourse, and should aim to win the love and esteem of others. If you affect valor but act with violence, the world will detest you in the end and will look upon you as wild beasts. Of this you should take heed.

4. *The soldiers and the sailors should highly value faithfulness and righteousness.*


Faithfulness and righteousness are the ordinary duties of man, but the soldier and the sailor, in particular, cannot be without them and remain in the ranks even for a day. Faithfulness implies the adherence to one's work; righteousness, the fulfillment of one's duty.

5. *The soldiers and the sailors should make simplicity their aim.*

These five articles should not be disregarded even for a moment by soldiers and sailors. In putting them into practice, sincerity is all-important. These five articles are the soul of Our soldiers and sailors, and sincerity is the soul of these articles. If the heart be not sincere, works and deeds, however good, are merely outward show and can avail nothing. Only if the heart be sincere can anything be accomplished. Moreover, these five articles are the Grand Way of Heaven and Earth and the universal law of humanity, easy to observe and practice. If you soldiers and sailors, in obedience to Our instruction, will observe and practice these principles and will fulfill your duty of grateful service to the country, it will be a source of joy, not to Ourselves alone, but to all the people of Japan.



Japanese Army Incendiary Bullet.



Japanese Army Explosive Bullet.



DON'T TAMPER WITH JAPANESE EXPLOSIVE BULLETS

Three different types of explosive and incendiary small-arms ammunition have been captured from the Japanese in the Southwest Pacific area. Because of the unusual characteristics of this ammunition, serious injuries sometimes have resulted when soldiers have tampered with it out of ignorance or curiosity.

Apparently first manufactured for use in Japanese aircraft or antiaircraft weapons, some of this ammunition has been found loaded in five round clips, presumably for use in infantry weapons. This ammunition—7.7-mm or 7.92-mm—may easily be recognized by color markings at the junction of the bullet with the cartridge or around the primer cap. It should not be handled carelessly.

The three different types of ammunition are the 7.7-mm rimmed Navy round, the 7.7-mm semi-rimmed Army round, and the 7.92-mm rimless Army round.

Explosive and incendiary rounds may be recognized by the color marking as indicated in the following table:

| Class of Ammunition | Type of Projectile | Position of Color Mark | Color | Shape of Nose |
|-------------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|----------|---------------|
| 7.7-mm Navy rimmed | Explosive | Primer cap | Dull red | ? |
| 7.7-mm Navy rimmed | Incendiary | Primer cap | Green | Pointed |
| 7.7-mm Army semi-rimmed | Explosive | Junction of case & proj. | Purple | Flat on tip |
| 7.7-mm Army semi-rimmed | Incendiary | Junction of case & proj. | Wine red | Pointed |
| 7.92-mm Army rimless | Explosive | Junction of case & proj. | White | Flat on tip |
| 7.92-mm Army rimless | Incendiary | Junction of case & proj. | Red | Pointed |

The 7.7-mm rimmed Navy round is of two kinds—one is a combination high-explosive and incendiary, the other only incendiary. Both types of the Army ammunition—the semi-rimmed and the rimless—are loaded either with an incendiary bullet or with a strictly explosive bullet (see illustration on page 32).


These bullets are not fuzed, but explode or ignite when the copper jacket is ruptured on impact with the target. The explosive bullet may be recognized by its flat nose, but the incendiary has the pointed nose of an ordinary bullet. The explosive bullet is capable of blowing a 3-inch hole in a sheet of aircraft Duralumin.

50-MM SMOKE GRENADE

The Japanese 50-mm smoke grenade is a 19-ounce cylindrical projectile similar to the Type 91 high-explosive grenade, and may be thrown by hand or fired from 50-mm grenade dischargers.

This grenade may be identified readily by its smooth, unpainted brass body. It is filled with 6.09 ounces of white phosphorus scattered by a bursting charge of explosive after the fuze has been activated. The fuze, which projects from one end of the grenade, is covered by a brass safety cap, which is held in place by a two-pronged safety pin. The propellant unit is a cylindrical steel projection at the other end of the grenade, and has six equally spaced gas ports around its side. A percussion cap is visible on the base of this projection.

To arm the grenade for firing, it is first necessary to screw down the striking pin. Before the grenade is inserted into the discharger, the safety pin is pulled, leaving the brass safety cap



Japanese 50-mm Smoke Grenade.

loosely in place. When the grenade is discharged, the striker sets back on the fuze percussion cap, which ignites a delay powder train. This burns down to a booster charge, which ignites the bursting charge, thus detonating the grenade and scattering the white phosphorus.

When the projectile is used as a hand grenade, the fuze is ignited by hitting the striker against a hard object, such as a steel helmet, before the grenade is thrown.



BEACH MINES

Japanese land-mine technique has reached its highest point to date in the efforts of the enemy to lay mines on beaches as a defense against probable U. S. landing operations.

Recent island assaults in the Central Pacific have disclosed a trend toward antiboat and antivehicle beach-mining, a type of activity which may be encountered to an even greater extent in the future. Until now this defensive tactic has been met principally on comparatively small islands where suitable landing beaches have been limited, and where the Japanese have had ample time to construct strong defensive installations.

The mine most frequently encountered in beach areas has been the double-horn hemisphere mine. The detonators of this mine consist of two lead-alloy horns, each containing a vial of acid. When either horn is bent or crushed, the acid vial is broken. The acid then contacts battery plates and generates a current which detonates the mine.

This mine has been used by the Japanese in several ways. Usually the mines have been set so they would detonate when pressure was put upon trip wires connected to the detonating horns.

At Tarawa this mine was found emplaced in the shallow water off shore. They were set between posts and other anti-boat obstacles, and trip wires were strung from the horns to the top of each adjoining obstacle.

During the landing on Tinian Island, hemisphere mines were found buried on the beach between the high and low water lines. In this position they were a hazard to boats beaching at high tide, and to personnel wading ashore from boats at low tide.

On other beaches many mines were found buried to horn depth in the sand and connected by trip wires strung between the horns of two or more mines. When wired in this manner, the weapons serve as antipersonnel as well as antivehicle mines.

Although these mines have been developed and used principally as an antiboat mine, it is not uncommon to find them emplaced several rows in depth on beaches and in the area just to the rear of the beach. When laid in this manner, they usually are set with a trip wire between mines, and constitute a hazard both to troops and to vehicles moving inland from the beaches.

To date the Japanese have tended to concentrate their efforts at mining to the beaches, and have neglected to use efficient inland minefields. This might be attributed to the characteristic Japanese defense doctrine which provides for the defeat of their enemies "at the water's edge," and does not envisage the possibility of an inland battle after a beachhead has been seized by the invading force.



U. S. soldiers fire a bazooka into a pillbox in the Siegfried Line.



A front view of a captured pillbox in the Siegfried Line.



Pillbox Warfare

in the Siegfried Line



The commanders of four U. S. rifle companies which have been in contact with the enemy in the Siegfried Line have furnished valuable information about the resistance offered by German pillboxes, and have submitted comments regarding the vulnerability, as well as the capabilities, of these fortifications. The terrain in which these rifle companies have been fighting contains many steep hills (some as high as 500 feet), woods with thick underbrush, and streams. Consequently, most of it is poor tank country. The pillboxes encountered by rifle companies have been of three types: some have had only one aperture, others have had mounted machine guns and two apertures, while still others have simply been personnel shelters. As to density, there has been approximately one pillbox every 100 yards in width and depth, and the fortifications have been mutually supporting. The Germans have had very good observation and an abundance of artillery and mortar support.

None of the company commanders' remarks should be construed as necessarily coinciding with United States Army doctrine.

Movement

"Most of the pillboxes seem to have been constructed to permit long-range fires. Once you get fairly close, there are quite a few dead spaces through which troops can filter. We've found it advisable either to view the routes from a good observation post on the previous day or to make a thorough map reconnaissance. One way of avoiding enemy fire has been to move across open ground, from ridge to ridge, during the hour just before daylight. Although one of our rifle companies gained only 100 yards in a whole day of fighting, because of extremely heavy German mortar and machine-gun fire, the same company caught the Germans unaware in the hour before daylight the next morning. It covered 1,000 yards without losing a man, and took six pillboxes without the aid of supporting weapons."

Cooperation with Mechanized Support

"When tanks or tank destroyers are used, infantry should be deployed, ready to rise and advance with the vehicles as the latter pass through the infantry positions. As I see it, infantry should not be allowed to stop because of mortar or artillery fire, for infantrymen who lose close contact with the tanks are more vulnerable, and the demoralizing effect of an infantry-tank assault upon the Germans is lost."

Assault Teams

"Each member of an assault team must know not only his own weapon and his own mission, but the weapon and mission

of everyone else on the team. That is, he must be familiar with flame throwers, demolition charges, rocket launchers, and so on. Sometimes each rifle platoon is assigned a fixed zone of responsibility. Each pillbox becomes a phase line for coordination and reorganization. In many instances a single platoon, by firing at the embrasures, will cause two or three German pillboxes to 'button up'. However, the Germans often will continue to fire through small slits in the embrasures. The fact that pillboxes are mutually supporting very definitely is something to remember. This is why our plans always include fire on flanking pillboxes, as well as on those which are to be assaulted."

Use of Smoke

"The saying that a blind man cannot shoot straight can be equally true of German pillboxes. While it is not always possible or desirable to use smoke, a pillbox which has received smoke and white phosphorus from 81-mm mortars and artillery is at a great disadvantage when the actual assault takes place."

Infantry and Direct Supporting Fire

"Supporting weapons, such as tanks, which have been placing direct fire on pillbox apertures should cease fire without signal as soon as the infantry comes within 25 yards of the pillbox. The Germans are likely to keep an aperture closed if the infantrymen nearest it take it under fire immediately. If two flanking groups of three or four men each take up positions in the rear of the pillbox, they can cover the rear entrance and apertures. If the support squad locates the embrasures in the supporting pillboxes and keeps them covered with fire, German



This U. S. soldier is peering into an abandoned German pillbox.



A U. S. tank destroyer has blasted this Siegfried Line pillbox with devastating fire from its 75.

capabilities are reduced proportionately. The rest of the company or platoon should move past the pillbox and secure the ground beyond it, to protect the assault team while the latter does its job.”

Possible Surrender

“We have a man work his way close to the pillbox, so that he can throw in a fragmentation grenade or white phosphorus grenade. When there is a quiet moment, he shouts, ‘*Kamerad?*’ and ‘*Wir schützen nicht!*’ (‘We won’t shoot!’). Often the occupants of the pillbox will give up at this stage. If they don’t surrender, use of rifle grenades or the bazooka against the steel doors or apertures may have the desired effect. For safety’s sake, other riflemen cover all fire ports while this is going on.”

Digging Them Out

“If the Germans refuse to surrender, some of our men work their way to the blind side of the pillbox and blow the embrasures with TNT. After this, working from the top, we place a pole charge against the door. We never allow anyone to enter the excavated area behind the pillbox, inasmuch as the Germans always cover it by means of a small embrasure built especially for this purpose. In no circumstance do we allow anyone to enter the pillbox to take prisoners. We make them come to us. Sometimes they claim that they are injured, but we have found that after a second charge of TNT they somehow manage to walk out.

“Antipersonnel mines may be found in the approaches to pillboxes. We always keep half an eye on the ground, just in case.”

Other Methods

"We have found that when the preceding measures fail, Siegfried Line pillboxes may be susceptible to still other assault methods. A demolition charge can be used, tanks can blast in the rear of the pillboxes, or a tank dozer can cover the door and embrasures with dirt. The use of tank dozers may not prove successful in the future because the Jerries are planting mines, some of them activated by remote control, as a countermeasure. The one time we used a flame thrower and a pole charge together, the combination started a fire inside the pillbox. Some ammunition got going, and the resulting confusion was all in our favor."

White-phosphorus Grenades

"After an embrasure has been blown out, the Germans often will remain in the pillbox until they have been persuaded to leave by a flame thrower or by hand grenades. A hand grenade in the ventilator of a pillbox sometimes stuns the Boche, but a white-phosphorus grenade in the same air shaft is likely to prove a great little reviver."

Precaution

"Even if the enemy surrenders, there may be some men who will not come out. Keeping the pillbox covered and throwing a grenade into each room before entering it is our favorite way of preventing further trouble."

Making Pillboxes Useless

"The Germans try to reoccupy pillboxes whenever possible. For this reason we believe in demolishing the fortifications im-

mediately. Six pillboxes in our portion of the Line have had to be taken three times. Merely blowing apertures and doors is not enough to make pillboxes untenable. We find that they must be completely destroyed right down to the ground. If even one wall is left standing, the Germans may use it as a place to fight from. This is why we like to have men follow close behind us with the necessary equipment to destroy the pillboxes completely.”

Readiness to Meet Counterattacks

“After a pillbox has been taken, deployment to the front and flank is a reasonable precaution against a German counterattack. We find it necessary to be ready for the rain of German mortar and artillery fire which always follows our capture of a pillbox. Bunching up around prisoners is a dangerous business. Since Jerry is quite prepared to shoot his own men rather than let them be taken prisoner, it’s a good trick to send them to the rear as quickly as possible.

“At least 1 hour before nightfall is a good time to halt an attack—and even earlier, if possible—inasmuch as it’s absolutely necessary to set up a proper defense. The Germans will launch a strong counterattack right after dark, and if you are not well organized, they will push you off your hard-won ground.

“When we intend to occupy a position, our men dig in, choosing spots around and between the pillboxes. If we use a pillbox as a rest position, to relieve our men from their fighting positions, we take care not to let an enemy counterattack catch us bunched up inside it. German combat patrols sometimes send one or two men around our flank to knock out our machine guns



Rear view of a well camouflaged German pillbox, part of the Siegfried Line defenses near Aachen.

when the counterattack is being made from the front. The enemy hope that we'll be so interested in firing to the front, to meet the main attack, that we'll neglect to watch our flanks and rear."

When the Counterattack Comes

"German counterattacks have been made after nightfall, and have been preceded by a lot of shouting and talking. This is supposed to be nervewracking. However, when our troops have

organized their positions well and are thoroughly alert, it is the enemy who suffers, instead. We have had success with 60-mm illuminating shells in lighting up these attacks. We hold our fire until Jerry comes in close, and then we cut him down in our final protective line. We use plenty of grenades, both fragmentation and white phosphorus. And when Jerry retreats, we follow him with fire and with fragmentation rifle grenades."

A Rifle Company vs. Three Pillboxes

"On 15 September our rifle company attacked a hill on which there were three pillboxes. Because of heavy fog, our tank destroyers could not fire; nevertheless, at 0730 we were within 50 yards of the pillboxes.

"We moved sufficiently near the pillboxes to place fire on the apertures, causing them to close. This took a BAR and a couple of riflemen. When the apertures were closed, we moved around to the rear of the pillboxes. Those men who were not part of the assault section moved out beyond the pillboxes and secured the hill which was our objective. The assault teams were left to reduce the pillboxes. These teams then closed in on the pillboxes from the rear. We called for the Germans to surrender, but they fired a few scattered rounds in return. We then fired two bazooka rounds into the door at the rear of each pillbox. In the case of two of the pillboxes, the bazooka and a couple of hand grenades thrown through the doors brought the Germans out into the open. We collected four prisoners from one box and six from the other.

"The Germans in the third pillbox refused to come out. This presented a bit of a problem. A couple of bazooka rounds fired

at the door, as well as a couple of hand grenades thrown through **the door**, merely drove the Jerries from one room to another. **Finally** they were driven into the room when the aperture was. A short burst of the flame thrower changed their minds about **surrendering.**"

These enemy comments have a special value for U. S. junior officers and enlisted men, not only because U. S. combat methods are seen through German eyes, but because of the marked emphasis on German counter-measures.

A Battalion Commander looks us over



Several weeks ago a Panzer Grenadier battalion commander prepared a report on his unit's recent experiences in combat against U. S. forces, and recommended possible improvements in German methods.

U. S. INFANTRY

During the past week of operations, the U. S. infantry has not gone in for aggressive action. When possible, they avoid close combat. When attacking, they mass behind tanks or sit on the tanks. They very seldom take advantage of darkness or fog to begin an attack. As a rule, an attack is preceded by a strong artillery preparation in which

the Americans employ all calibers, including their heaviest. Planes are used for fire direction, and excellent results have been obtained. The infantry shoots wildly into areas where the presence of our troops is suspected, or into our principal sectors. Most of the fire is unaimed.

U. S. ARTILLERY

Artillery directed by observation planes places fire on each of our movements. The infantry main effort usually is supported by good fire concentration and by tanks. German counterattacks are harassed by U. S. fighter bombers, which strafe and bomb German infantry.

Fire concentrations on road crossings and identified positions are always placed at irregular intervals.

U. S. TANKS

If a U. S. tank is hit by our antitank weapons, the other tanks immediately turn away. In breaking through to our positions, they fire on our troops in foxholes with automatic rifles and machine-gun fire. It is therefore recommended that we dig our foxholes at a right angle underground. In attacking U. S. tanks at close range, the large rifle grenade and bazooka have proved to be valuable weapons. The small rifle grenade was found to be ineffective and unable to penetrate the tanks.

GERMAN ATTACK METHODS

As to our own attacks, we found them to be more successful when they were launched without artillery preparation, so as to gain surprise. Also, we have made the most of darkness and fog.

If artillery support is used, it is best to camouflage the concentration in the sector of our attack by simultaneously covering the other sectors with fire.

Whenever possible, attack preparations should be avoided during the day. U. S. air observation detects every movement, and directs sudden and heavy fire concentrations on the deployment area.

To avoid losses, the line of departure should be reached by infiltra-

tion. Attack in depth cuts down our own losses and allows us to employ our troops flexibly.

When our troops have been caught by U. S. artillery fire, we have found it very hard to escape trying to go around this fire. Therefore, it is recommended that our troops take cover immediately. If this is done, our troops should work their way close enough to be inside the minimum range of artillery and mortars. It has often proved advisable to attach 81-mm mortars to the assaulting units.

It is also useful to have an observation post well forward at the point of main effort, to direct fire from the captured positions.

With reference to the lack of cooperation by the artillery, it must be emphasized again and again that everyone must help the infantrymen.

At the point of main effort, double communication must be ensured by telephone and radio.

GERMAN DEFENSE METHODS

The following are recommended:

1. Deployment in depth in the sector. Always have a reserve available even though it is only a small force.

2. Establishment of three observation posts simultaneously—in the main line of resistance, in the advanced sector of resistance, and in the immediate vicinity of a gun position.

In previous engagements the installation of three observation posts proved very valuable, because the enemy always was under our observation and fire, even though a penetration had been made.

Only one 81-mm mortar should be attached to the attacking company. Readiness and quick changing of positions make this a valuable weapon. The remainder of the weapons should be under the control of the mortar platoon leader for concentrated use in any one sector.



THE NEW 88 AND ITS CARRIAGES

German experiences with Soviet heavy tanks have resulted in the production of some very powerful guns. Among these is the Model 1943 88-mm gun. This improved 88 has a very high muzzle velocity, which enables gunners to lay on and hit even distant moving targets with considerable ease. In fact, the trajectory followed by the projectile is so flat that, with certain sights, the gunner can make his own elevation calculations up to a range of 3,700 yards for high-explosive projectiles and 4,400 yards for armor-piercing projectiles. A trajectory as flat as this naturally means that gunners can open fire on tanks and other armored vehicles without preliminary registration. The rise of the shell in its flight seldom will be greater than the height of a tank.

Besides being used as a direct-laid gun, the variations of the Model 1943 can also fire either time-fuzed or percussion 20.68-pound, high-explosive shells as far as 16,570 yards.


The verified armor-penetration capabilities of the Model 43 88's are remarkable. With the newer type of 22.4-pound capped armor-piercing shell (with ballistic cap to provide streamlining), the following can be achieved:

| <i>Range</i> | <i>Penetration</i> |
|--------------|--|
| | (shell hitting at right angles to the armor) |
| 1,000 yards | 7.87 inches |
| 2,000 yards | 6.61 inches |
| 2,500 yards | 6.02 inches |

The Model 43 88's have certain drawbacks, however. While raising the muzzle velocity, the Germans have tried to keep



When mounted on a carriage like that of the old Flak 18, the new 88 is called the 8.8-cm Pak 43. Here a piece is sited on an Italian hill crest, to open fire instantly on targets entering the valley.




The new 88 on a conventional artillery carriage is called the 8.8-cm Pak 43/41. This view shows it in defilade on the reverse slope of a hill. It has just scored a hit on a tank appearing on the skyline.

down the weight of the gun. The result is a light tube with a considerably reduced safety factor. Therefore, German gun crews have been warned not to use high-velocity ammunition in Model 1943 tubes which have fired as many as 500 rounds. To preserve the gun tube against erosion, they may fire high-explosive shell with a low-velocity propellant rated at 1,080 feet per second. This ammunition gives a maximum range of only 7,765 yards.

Thus far the Model 43 88's have appeared in the new Royal Tiger tank; in the "Elephant" (formerly called the "Ferdinand"), the "Rhinoceros" (formerly called the "Hornet"), and *Panzerjäger Panther* tank destroyers; and on two towed carriages (the *Pak 43* and the *Pak 43/41*). Of these, the heavily-armored "Elephant" chassis has been found to be too cumbersome and mechanically unreliable. The "Rhinoceros" chassis is too slow; its armor is open on top, and provides protection only against shell splinters and caliber .30 bullets. The *Pak 43/41* ground mount also appears to be unsatisfactory. Its conventional split-trail artillery carriage must be so heavy (9,660 pounds) that the complete piece weighs almost as much as the 12,300-pound 150-mm medium gun-howitzer *s.F.H. 18*. Such a weight precludes manhandling, and is a great handicap in getting the gun trained on a target which appears from an angle not covered by the carriage's 60-degree traverse.

More suitable is the *Pak 43* carriage, which has wheel bogies in the front and rear, like an 88-mm *Flak 18*. This carriage not only better distributes the weight over the ground, but permits firing from the wheels with a 60-degree traverse. If the out riggers are emplaced, full 360-degree traverse is possible. With bogies removed, the *Pak 43* has a very low silhouette for so large a piece. Emplaced on commanding ground, the capabilities of its high-velocity tube and all-round traverse make it a




The upper photograph shows the armor thicknesses on the Panzerjäger Panther. The close-up below indicates points vulnerable to infantry attack: sight opening (1), hatches (2), ventilators (3), periscopes (4), and the rear door (5).

formidable weapon. In the case of the *Pak 43* illustrated on page 53, the site chosen was on the forward slope of a hill. Thanks to its range, and to the lack of cover in target areas, the gun could open instant and effective fire as soon as hostile infantry or vehicles were detected on the crests of surrounding hills, or in the defiles between them. While the *Pak 43* on this carriage offers formidable opposition for armored vehicles and direct-laid weapons, its light shield (two thicknesses of 5 mm each) gives no side and rear protection for the gun crew. As a result, the *Pak 43* is especially vulnerable to indirect-laid artillery fire.

In this last respect, the *Panzerjäger Panther* is an improvement on the *Pak 43*. By mounting the Model 43 88 in a well-armored box on a Panther chassis, the Germans have provided good protection for crew and gun. Because of the Panther chassis, the *Panzerjäger Panther* is also a very handy weapon. Little traverse is built into the gun mount, but the Panther suspension is so built that the driver can swing the chassis around without forward movement. At present the *Panzerjäger Panther* is believed to be used as an unusual infantry-support weapon. Dug-in well to the rear of the main line of resistance, it uses its long-range, direct-fire capabilities to deal with elusive targets attacking German positions. Its excellent armor ordinarily would permit it to act as an assault gun, or to fight tanks at close range, but scarcity of tanks and bombed-out production lines cause the Germans to keep the *Panzerjäger Panthers* out of close-range fighting, except in emergencies. In their present role of linking up strong points, these vehicles may prove difficult weapons to combat, especially when their suspension is protected by digging-in.

Of the carriages for the new Model 43 88, the best known



The well-armored Royal Tiger is better armed than the standard Tiger. The Model 43 88 has a length of 71 calibers (71 times 88 mm), as compared with 56 calibers for the older Tiger's KwK. 36. The Model 43 has a muzzle velocity of 2,460 feet per second with high explosive, and as much as 3,708 feet per second with armor-piercing rounds. Since the time of flight of an armor-piercing round at a range of 2,200 yards is 2.2 seconds or less, accuracy and correction of fire against moving targets is greater than with older tank and antitank guns.

is the improved Tiger tank called the Royal Tiger (*Königstiger*). This Tiger, first introduced on the Eastern Front in the winter of 1943-44, weighs 75 tons in action (more than 66 British tons). Just as important as the gun to the Royal Tiger's combat efficiency is its new armor, which is sloped for added resistance to armor-piercing projectiles (see page 57). In fact, the Royal Tiger looks much like the Panther, except for the fact that the side superstructure armor slants upward from rear to front. The turret is noticeably different, also.

As in the case of all recent German tanks, the tracks of the Royal Tiger are very wide—2 feet 8½ inches. This not only lessens the likelihood of serious damage by a single mine, but means that the weight is so distributed that the tank can climb a 35-degree slope or a 2-foot 9-inch step, and can ford streams 5 feet 9 inches deep. The Royal Tiger can do 24 miles an hour on roads, but only 9 to 12 miles an hour in cross-country travel.

For close-in defense, the Royal Tiger has a coaxial 7.92-mm machine gun next to the 88, and another in the hull. An anti-aircraft machine-gun mounting is fitted on top of the commander's cupola. The crew of five (the commander, gunner, loader, who are in the turret, and the driver and radio operator, who are in the front of the hull) have only one pistol port. This port is in the door in the rear of the turret, and consists of a conical plug closed by a chain. If the crew find it necessary to open hatches for observation or to use small arms, the following openings are available:

| <u>Hull</u> | <u>Turret</u> |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Hatch over driver | Hatch on top of commander's |
| Hatch over radio operator | cupola |
| | Hatch on right of top |
| | Hatch on rear slope |
| | Door in rear plate |




NOTES ON TIGER TANKS IN THE BATTLE FOR FLORENCE

In the battle for Florence, a New Zealand division had its first experience with standard Tiger tanks on a fairly large scale, and noted several useful points about the ways in which the Germans employed these vehicles.

As a rule, the Tigers were well sited and well camouflaged with natural foliage. To delay the New Zealand infantry and to pick off tanks, the Tigers were used in hull-down positions. Another enemy method was to send Tigers by covered routes to previously selected positions. From these positions the Germans would fire a few harassing rounds, withdraw, and move to alternate positions. Tigers also were used to provide close support for German infantry, to lend additional fire power to artillery concentrations, and to engage buildings occupied by the New Zealanders. These troops noted that almost invariably a Tiger would be sited with at least one other tank or a self-propelled gun in support. The supporting tank or gun would remain silent unless its fire was absolutely needed. Sometimes a Tiger would be accompanied by infantrymen—often only 6 to 12 of them—deployed on the flanks as far as 50 yards away from the tank.

The New Zealanders were of the opinion that the Tiger's heavy front and rear armor made it unlikely that the tank would be knocked out by hits on these parts. Simultaneous frontal and flank attacks were considered desirable. The New Zealanders found the Tigers' side armor definitely vulnerable to fire from

17-pounders. Other weak spots, it was reported, were the rear of the tank, just over the engines, and the large exhaust hole, also in the rear and just over the left of center. Some commanders found high explosives the most effective ammunition against these rear parts.



This is a standard Tiger tank — or, as the Germans designate it, Pz. Kpfw. Tiger. (The Roman numeral "VI" has been dropped.)

As a rule, the Tigers were placed in position so skillfully that the New Zealanders found it difficult to employ a sniping anti-tank gun or a towed gun for stalking purposes. Unless very careful reconnaissance was carried out to site the gun to the best advantage, and so as to detect German supporting tanks or self-propelled guns, the effort was likely to be fruitless. For

this reason, the New Zealanders concluded that maximum time for reconnaissance, and the maximum amount of information, were essential for a battery commander who was called upon to engage a Tiger. The German tank-and-gun combination seemed to be slow at maneuvering and firing, and also very susceptible to blinding by U. S. 75-mm smoke ammunition. On one occasion, two smoke rounds, followed by armor-piercing projectiles, were enough to force a Tiger to withdraw.

Sometimes the Germans used their Tigers with marked recklessness, the crews taking risks to an extent which indicated their extreme confidence in their vehicles. This rendered the latter vulnerable to New Zealand tank-hunting squads armed with close-range antitank weapons. When Tigers were closed down, and were attacking on their own at some distance from their supporting guns, the tanks' vulnerability to these close-range weapons was increased correspondingly.

Tigers were effectively knocked out, or were forced to withdraw, by concentrations of field artillery. It was clear that German tank crews feared the damaging effect of shell fire against such vital parts as tracks, suspension, bogie wheels, radio aerials, electrical equipment, and so on. The New Zealanders incorporated medium artillery in several of their artillery concentrations, and decided that medium pieces were suitable when a sufficiently large concentration could be brought to bear. However, owing to a dispersion of rounds, it was considered preferable to include a good concentration of field guns, to "thicken up" the fire. The division in question had no experience in using heavy artillery against Tigers.

It was admittedly difficult to locate stationary, well camouflaged Tigers which had been sited for defensive firing. Worth

mentioning, however, is the performance of an artillery observation post, which was notified by Allied tanks that a Tiger was believed to be in a certain area. The observation post began to range. A round falling in the vicinity of the suspected tank blasted away the vehicle's camouflage, and the Tiger promptly retreated.

Several of the New Zealand antitank gunners' experiences in combating Tigers will be of special interest:

1. A Tiger was observed about 3,000 yards away, engaging three Shermans. When it set one of the Shermans afire, the other two withdrew over a crest. A 17-pounder was brought up to within 2,400 yards of the Tiger, and engaged it from a flank. When the Tiger realized that it was being engaged by a high-velocity gun, it swung around 90 degrees so that its heavy frontal armor was toward the gun. In the ensuing duel, one round hit the turret, another round hit the suspension, and two near-short rounds probably ricocheted into the tank. The tank was not put out of action. The range was too great to expect a kill; hence the New Zealanders' tactics were to make the Tiger expose its flank to the Shermans at a range of almost 500 yards, by swinging around onto the antitank gun. The Tiger did just this, and, when it was engaged by the Shermans, it withdrew. The enemy infantry protection of half a dozen to a dozen men was engaged by machine guns.


2. At the junction of a main road and a side road, a Tiger was just off the road, engaging forward troops in buildings. Another Tiger, about 50 yards up the side road, was supporting the first. A field-artillery concentration was called for. It appeared to come from one battery only. Although no hits were observed, both Tigers withdrew.

3. A Tiger on a ridge was engaged by what appeared to be a battery of mediums. After the first few rounds had fallen, the crew bailed out. (It is not known why.) Shortly afterward, while the tank still was being shelled, a German soldier returned to the tank and drove it off. About 10 minutes later, the remainder of the crew made a dash along the same route their tank had taken.

4. A tank hidden in the garage of a two-story house ventured out for about 20 yards, fired a few harassing rounds, and returned to its shelter. Many hits on the building were scored by 4.2-inch mortars firing cap-on, but little damage was visible. Each night the tank was withdrawn from the area, even though it was in an excellent concealed position and was protected by infantry. Later the house was examined. Although it had suffered appreciable damage—and there were several dead Germans about—there was no evidence that damage had been done to the tank itself.

How the
Germans Fight

in wooded and broken terrain





The Germans recognize that operations in wooded and broken terrain require special combat methods both in the attack and in the defense. In such terrain the Germans try to control all roads and trails, so as to ensure the movement of support weapons and supplies. The heaviest fighting therefore generally takes place in the vicinity of these roads and trails.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

In the attack the Germans maintain careful protective fire as they advance along the roads and trails; when they are obliged to move across open stretches, this protective fire becomes continuous. Roads are opened up as rapidly as possible, and are covered with antitank guns. Special attention is paid to the formations adopted during movement and in battle, to correct employment of fire power, to appropriate communication methods, to the problem of maintaining direction, and to supplying forward elements with an adequate amount of ammunition.

In the defense it is considered essential to block roads and trails. Snipers are posted in trees. Centers of resistance are established at curves, bends, and defiles, and whenever a road climbs to higher ground. Firing positions are prepared just off roads and trails, to command open fields of fire.

METHOD OF ADVANCE

In the approach march, squads and platoons advance on a

"In the defense it is considered essential to block roads and trails. Snipers are posted in trees. Centers of resistance are established at curves and defiles, and whenever a road climbs to higher ground."



"In the approach march, squads and platoons advance on a narrow front, deployed in depth along roadside hedges and scrub growth."

narrow front, deployed in depth along roadside hedges and scrub growth, and in hollows running in the desired direction. The leading squads, on contact, serve as scouts and patrols. They advance in extended order, with a light machine gun leading. While the squads immediately behind the forward squads deploy less deeply at intervals of 30 to 40 paces, the subsequent squads follow in squad columns so as to have all-around observation and protection. Special observers are detailed to watch out for tree snipers.

The Germans believe that when battle is joined, the same formations employed during the approach march should be maintained as far as possible. Fire cover is provided by the support weapons, especially the mortars, which advance with the forward troops. However, the Germans recognize that further deployment of squads and platoons may be necessary. It is a German principle that after resistance has been crushed and hostile strong points eliminated, the original formations should be resumed immediately.

The reserve platoon advances, employing the same close formation, in the rear of the platoon which gains the most ground. The commander of the reserve platoon arranges for all-around protection, particularly to repel surprise attacks which may be made by hostile forces from centers of resistance not yet engaged. These protective measures also include protection of the rear.

USE OF FIRE POWER

To eliminate centers of resistance, the Germans employ all available light and heavy weapons, especially mortars.

Since observation in close country is difficult, the Germans



"Sometimes observers can work only from treetops. In the heat of battle, disk signaling is preferred."

not only keep their support weapons well forward, but often use their heavy machine guns as light machine guns.

Terrain conditions are likely to have a definite effect on German employment of mortars. Sometimes observers can work only from treetops. Every effort is made to place observers close to the mortar positions so that corrections can be passed accurately and rapidly to the mortar detachment. The employment of message runners is not considered practicable in the heat of battle; instead, disk signaling is preferred. The Germans try not to site their mortars too close to the roadside scrub growth.

The commanders of the support weapons are required to re-



"The antitank guns take over the job of preventing hostile tanks from using the roads."

port their availability to the leading rifle company commander and his platoon commanders, and to remain in their vicinity.

The antitank guns follow without orders in the rear of the infantry, as soon as the roads have been cleared. Their principal mission is to take over the job of preventing hostile tanks from using the roads. In addition, so far as their principal mission permits, the antitank guns take part in attacks on Allied centers of resistance, using antitank high-explosive shells.

Protected by the fire of the support weapons, the infantry works its way forward as close as possible to the Allied centers of resistance. As soon as the support weapons cease firing, the infantry breaks through, hurling hand grenades. The Germans are scrupulously careful in regulating the time when the sup-



"Compass directions are issued before the departure."



"Because of terrain difficulties, the Germans find it useful to equip squads with ladders, axes, good knives, and sharp spades."

port weapons are to cease firing—first the medium mortars and then the heavy machine guns—and the time when the breakthrough is to be attempted. The points at which the breakthrough is to be made are sealed off on the flanks by squads especially detailed for this job. Hostile positions along hedges or other roadside growth are mopped-up after the breakthrough.

MISCELLANEOUS PRECAUTIONS

Platoons and squads detail men for the express purpose of maintaining contact with neighboring units. These men indicate the headquarters of their own units by means of pennants and by signaling with lamps to flanking squads and platoons. It is a rule that pennants marked "Front Line" always be put up. Identification panels are laid out, when necessary, to indicate the advance of the front line.

Because the opportunities for unobserved movement are very good in terrain of this type, the Germans make considerable use of runners. Radio-telegraphy and smoke cartridges also are used, in addition to the light signals.

Higher headquarters are continually kept informed about the situation, to permit smooth coordination of the attack.

Since the problem of maintaining direction is difficult in closely wooded and unevenly wooded terrain, squad leaders are given specific rendezvous on roads and paths. Compass directions are issued before the departure.

Because of terrain difficulties, the Germans find it useful to equip squads with ladders, axes, good knives, and sharp spades. Since ammunition supply is likely to be slow and cannot be relied upon, a generous quantity of ammunition, including hand grenades, is issued to the men before the departure.



DECEPTION, GERMAN-STYLE

A set of German training instructions covering various methods of deceiving Allied soldiers appears to have been so successful with German troops in Russia that Field Marshal Kesselring thought it worth adopting for the German Southwest Command. Most of the tricks suggested in these instructions apply to troops on the defensive or in retreat. While some of the methods are old stand-bys, others are fresh little masterpieces of enemy cunning. The instructions certainly do not leave much to the student's imagination, but go straight to the business of teaching him how to be barbarous by the numbers.

Here they are:

1. Divert the enemy's attention in the opposite direction, so that you can approach him silently from the rear and make your kill, or so that you bypass him unnoticed. Make a noise by throwing stones. Use small parties to attract attention while the main body carries out the envelopment.

2. Draw mines across the road just in front of a hostile vehicle, and kill the crew from ambush as they climb out.



3. If a member of your ambush party who has been hit and who has moved away from cover calls for help, do not go to his aid immediately. The man who does so will also be exposed to enemy fire.

4. Noise-making devices in the vicinity of wire obstacles, as well as the use of dummies, can induce Allied soldiers to open fire. In this way the number and location of hostile weapons can be determined.

5. If it is necessary for you to pretend to be dead, lie down as close as possible to enemy dead until the danger is past or until night has fallen. A helmet pierced by small-arms fire will lend added realism when you are feigning death.



6. Mine deserted trenches.

7. Cut telephone cables at night, and draw one end into an ambush so that hostile linesmen can be killed or captured.

8. When hostile patrols approach, hold your fire until the last possible minute. This increases your chance of killing or capturing personnel.

9. By using single rounds from a 20-mm machine gun in an armored car, you can make the enemy think you have a heavy antitank gun.

10. By warming up your vehicle engines, you can imitate the sound of vehicles approaching and departing, and thus can simulate troop movements.

11. Put up boards with "Danger—Mines!" and a death's head painted on them. Fence off the area with wire. Make tracks around the resulting dummy minefield, and mine them.



12. Patrols using captured vehicles often can achieve surprise. Captured vehicles also can be useful when you are trying to lure hostile soldiers into an ambush.

13. When your patrols approach populated places, they may find it profitable to stop suddenly, fire a few shots in the direction of the village, turn, and make a getaway. The opposition is likely to disclose itself by firing.

14. Patrols operating behind the enemy's front lines should turn sign posts and notice boards to face the wrong direction or to lead into an ambush.

15. If the enemy locates an observation patrol, the men should set up dummies, and depart so that they may be employed to advantage elsewhere.



16. If a reconnaissance or combat patrol is observed by the enemy and finds it necessary to withdraw, the members of the patrol should hang jackets on the wire or place helmets with the tops showing, to hold the enemy's attention.

17. Cover weapon positions with boards, and camouflage them to resemble the surrounding terrain. The occupant of a position then can push the board up with his helmet, fire at hostile personnel at close range, and duck back into his hidden position again.

18. Place piles of straw or wood around gasoline cans in the vicinity of your positions. If the enemy approaches you at night, fire on these materials and thus illuminate the attackers.

19. In a system of defense based on strongpoints, build a dummy position between the strongpoints. At night fire light signals to give the

impression of a continuous line of defense. Put up artificial cover for the enemy in front of such a position and mine it. Or else arrange that the exits lead him into your field of fire.

20. Prepare dummy fuel dumps out of old cans and barrels, so as to lure hostile air attacks.

21. Prepare dummy bivouacs and other concentrations by using tents, wooden crates, and derelict vehicles.

22. At night, leave lights in partly blacked-out houses—or keep small fires burning—in areas well away from genuine bivouacs.

23. Deflect bombing attacks by displaying swastika flags prominently on knocked-out vehicles at a safe distance from your own positions.



Patrolling on Guam

The following article has been submitted to the Intelligence Bulletin by the 77th Infantry Division. This account of the extensive use of patrols for combat intelligence, and the success with which they were employed, is published for the information of all personnel.



Early one morning, long after organized resistance on Guam had ceased—even after Tokyo had announced the loss of the island—an emaciated, long-haired little Jap stepped out of the jungle and surrendered at reveille to a group of U. S. soldiers. When interrogated by intelligence officers, he repeatedly announced his amazement at the great speed and power with which American troops had captured Guam. He knew that U. S. patrols had killed three of his comrades in the hills when he es-

caped; but what he did not know was that these patrols, and many more like them, had made possible the very fact which so astounded him—the rapid advance of the American forces.

Aggressive patrols of all types were employed continuously by the U. S. forces throughout the campaign. The success of these patrols not only made possible the speed and directness of the 77th Division's advance, but also gave confidence to the men, and convinced all troops of the importance of scouting and patrolling.

Some of the methods used, together with the results, are discussed here.

Development of Patrolling

Directly after the landing on Guam, patrols at first were sent only short distances, so as not to interfere with the great volume of artillery, air, and naval gun-fire support, and so as to accustom new troops gradually to operations against the enemy. In some organizations, volunteers were used; in other organizations, the best qualified men were chosen arbitrarily. In any case, these first men proved to the rest that it could be done, and on their return from patrol became the objects of great admiration. Others soon began clamoring for the chance to do the same work, until finally all men got an opportunity to go on at least one patrol. The success of these missions buoyed the men's confidence in their own ability, and patrolling soon became a regular duty. Regiments then were ordered to patrol continuously to distances of approximately 2,000 yards. Longer missions were assigned to the Reconnaissance Troop, and as early as D plus 5 its patrols started for objectives on the east and south coast of the island, a distance of some 5 to 7 miles.



"Each patrol carried an SCR 300 radio for communications, and enough rations to last for three days."

Reconnaissance Patrolling

Long-range reconnaissance was performed by small patrols of the Reconnaissance Troop. They consisted of not more than four or five men. Each patrol carried an SCR 300 radio for communications and enough rations for three days. It was believed that small, lightly equipped patrols of this type would have the best chance of making successful penetrations deep into the area held by the enemy. Between 26 July and 30 July, seven such patrols traveled routes totalling over 80 miles, and spent 56 man-days in Jap-held Guam, without suffering a single casualty.

Their general routes and objectives were carefully planned, but the precise routes were left to the discretion of patrol leaders.

A schedule of hours for reporting, and a simple "number" code for geographical locations were prearranged with each patrol leader. Patrol leaders were free to send messages at any time, but were required to make reports every 3 hours during a prescribed 10-minute period. Every night, patrols moved after dark to positions which could be defended easily, and remained there until morning.

For days these patrols worked their way along the sword-grass slopes, dodging occasional Jap patrols, sleeping in caves, maintaining a lookout for activity along the east and south coasts of the island, making contact with small Jap forces, and encountering friendly Chamorros. The patrols obtained vital information, which when put together at Division Headquarters, indicated that the Japs were withdrawing from the southern half of Guam. Since the patrols maintained contact with these withdrawing Japs, G-2 knew from day to day exactly where the enemy troops were.

As a result, the Division was able to shift its strength to the left, take Mt. Tenjo, and, on 31 July, to drive straight across to the east coast of the island in record time. Moreover, it was possible to maintain a hot pursuit of the withdrawing Japs without worrying too much about the vulnerability of an exposed flank and rear.

Combat Patrolling

While the Division still was consolidating its beachhead, combat patrols from infantry regiments constantly combed the areas in front of their positions, harassing the Japs and cleaning them out of caves, huts, and other places of hiding which they occupied during the day. These patrols, which ranged in size from

reinforced squads to reinforced companies, kept the Japs disorganized; destroyed their small caches of food, supplies, and ammunition; and tended to break up enemy attempts to reorganize for counterattacks.

After organized resistance had ended, there still remained the job of hunting down and destroying isolated groups of Jap troops, which were continuing to operate in the jungle and which were hiding out in the hills and along the coastal cliffs of the north end of the island. This task was accomplished by strong combat patrols, which operated in the area north of a straggler line established across the center of the island in the Division sector.



"According to plan, the tanks turned left along the Finegayan road and traveled to the Division boundary, where they encountered and destroyed three Jap supply trucks."

Tank Patrolling

On 2 August a light tank company was used to establish contact with the enemy ahead of forward infantry elements in the vicinity of Barrigada.

The tanks proceeded without opposition to San Antonio cross-roads, where they flushed a Jap light machine-gun crew of five men. The tanks then moved up the road to Barrigada Village, where 15 to 20 Japs fled into the woods. According to plan, the tanks turned left along the Finegayan road and traveled to the Division boundary, where they encountered and destroyed three Jap supply trucks. Returning to Barrigada, the tankmen destroyed a makeshift roadblock, bypassed a pillbox, and moved about 400 yards to the northeast. At this point they were fired on by a 20-mm gun, and were attacked by about a company of Jap riflemen, who swarmed out from a defensive position and assaulted the tanks with hand grenades. By this time U. S. infantrymen were approaching the village on a wide front from the south, and the tanks were withdrawn. Thus the infantry was enabled to stage a successful attack against the disclosed enemy position.

However, the intelligence information was not foolproof. Wily Jap riflemen and machine gunners, in well-concealed positions astride the Barrigada-Finegayan road just north of the village clearing, had not exposed themselves or opened fire on two occasions when the U. S. tanks had passed between them. They waited to catch the infantry crossing the open fields.

Security Patrolling

In addition to combat patrolling by front-line infantry troops, considerable security patrolling was required throughout the

entire rear area of the Division. The dense jungle growth in the northern half of Guam confined movement to roads and trails, for the most part. As a result, some groups of Japs were by-passed during the advance, while others infiltrated through U. S. forward positions. Even after the backbone of resistance on the island had been broken, isolated groups of well-armed Japs were found everywhere, and all U. S. troops—regardless of whether they were artillerymen, ordnance mechanics, clerks, medics, or truck drivers—found it necessary to secure their bivouacs and positions by patrolling constantly around them. These were called “mop-up” or “termite” patrols.

Snipers often were encountered along main supply routes, or in and around areas which had been cleared and passed several days before. In one instance, a patrol found a strongly armed group of Japs well concealed and hidden in the jungle, about 400 yards from the Division Command Post. This group was approximately of company strength. In another instance, clerks of the Adjutant General's Section, patrolling around the Division Rear Echelon, found a group of armed Japs in a wooded ravine running through their area.

It was found expedient to patrol around bivouacs and installations at least twice a day—just after daybreak and before dark. Tanks often were used to reinforce these patrols. At the Division Command Post even the band was pressed into this service.

Ambushes

Japs are great trail users. U. S. Troops found it very profitable, especially at night, to lay ambushes along trails leading into their own positions and to water points. Infiltrating Japs invariably stumbled headlong into these ambushes.

Patrol Reinforcements

Both reconnaissance and combat patrols often were accompanied by engineer parties, artillery forward observers, and native guides whose reliability had been verified by intelligence. Accompanying engineers were able to reconnoiter roads and bridges well ahead of front-line troops. The engineers who went along with one of the Reconnaissance Troop's long-distance patrols on 29 July, were able to select a route along which the Division later built a supply road. Artillery observers adjusted fire upon targets encountered by the patrols that they accompanied. Most of the native guides knew approximately where the Japs were situated, and the guides' familiarity with the terrain saved the patrols countless steps and a great deal of time, especially in the jungle.

The regiment which was to spearhead the Division attack across the island sent a noncom along with one of the Reconnaissance Troop's patrols, which crossed the island along the same route the Division planned to follow. This soldier later acted as a guide for the regiment when the advance started.

Planning and Coordinating Patrols

To prevent any overlapping of patrols, and to ensure complete patrol coverage of the entire Division front and flanks, sectors of responsibility and patrol routes were assigned and coordinated by G-2 and Regimental S-2's.

The problem of coordinating long-distance patrols with artillery, air, and naval gun-fire support could not be overlooked. To safeguard the patrols, it was necessary to have them make periodic radio reports of their exact positions, so that each fire-support mission called for by the infantry could be checked

with the location of the patrol before it was fired. On the other hand, patrols could not be allowed to interfere with defensive fires, especially with night fires in support of front-line troops. However, in no instance was it necessary to refuse a fire support request on account of patrols, and in one instance a patrol itself was able to direct artillery fire, by radio, on a small concentration of Jap troops.

Routes of the combat patrols which cleaned up the northern part of the Division sector after organized resistance had ceased were changed daily because it was found that the Japanese would clear out of an area as soon as one of the patrols had worked it over. Patrolling to eliminate the armed remnants of the enemy force required careful planning, as well as patience and hard work.



HOW TO HELP THE ENEMY


Japanese and German intelligence officers have acquired valuable combat intelligence information through the negligence of U.S. officers and enlisted men. Despite considerable education in field security, combat troops are seriously jeopardizing Allied operations by deliberately violating security regulations.

Enemy officers have expressed amazement at American troops' apparent disregard for security, and have discussed specific examples.

A German intelligence officer, who has interrogated both American and British prisoners of war, remarked that the security of documents in the American army was "absolutely shocking." Time after time, he said, Top Secret documents were found in the vehicles, and on the persons, of Americans captured in front-line fighting. He cited a case in which a Top Secret order-of-battle document was found on an American lieutenant who had been taken prisoner. This document gave the complete regrouping of American forces for the breakthrough at Avranches. If the Germans had been able to secure the air cover necessary to permit them to move their troops, the German officer said, they could have stopped the attack, for the document gave advance notice of many locations and moves of the Allied forces. He also said that when he mentioned this document to his prisoner, the American lieutenant replied, "Well, you can't keep all these things in your head."

A Japanese officer told how Japanese forces obtained similar combat intelligence early in a certain island campaign. According to the officer, on the day the American invasion forces

landed, the Japanese found an identification tag on a Marine casualty. In addition to the official information on the tag, the Marine—apparently on his own initiative— had added the words, “4th Marines”.

Later that day the Japanese also captured a map which had, in addition to other valuable information, the symbol  drawn in at a certain village. The officer said that he knew the symbol indicated some type of headquarters, but that he was not sure of the size of the unit indicated. However, the numeral “4” had been written on the right side of the map. From this numeral, on the symbol, and from the captured dog tag, the Japanese were able to conclude that they were opposed by the 4th Marine Division.

The Japanese are aware of the value of documents in intelligence, and place great importance upon their capture. In the intelligence plans of a Japanese division are these instructions: “There will be useful articles on abandoned enemy dead, who are to be searched immediately after battle. Their possessions—especially documents, diaries and maps, which have very great value—are to be collected.” The order points out that in spite of instructions, Japanese lower units are collecting only weapons and food and that the “collection of the most valuable intelligence material is being sadly neglected.” Subordinates were instructed to detail one section of a reserve unit as a document collection group.

There is ample evidence that the Japanese know how to use the information which comes into their hands through field intelligence. Time and again, Japanese orders have included such references as these: “It is believed that the enemy intends to launch a strong attack in the near future, according to informa-

tion gathered from sketches and diaries taken from enemy dead," and "The diaries abandoned by Allied soldiers of the southern group have made clear the enemy's topography and his plans for infiltrating forces into places not under our control."

U.S. soldiers who have been prisoners of war have revealed that American troops are carrying into battle personal letters, diaries, unit rosters, and similar important documents. These items are just what the enemy is looking for to complete his intelligence estimates of the situation.



—Courtesy of *Yank*, the Army Weekly.